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Murphy: The Reed Case

THE REED CASE:
THE SEED FOR EQUAL PROTECTION FROM
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION, OR
POLITE JUDICIAL HEDGING?

A

liberation movement became the recipient of increased
national publicity, and as many citizens debated the proper role of
the female within society, a seed of controversy sown in Idaho was carried
by the "winds of justice" to Washington, D.C., where a sex-based statutory
classification scheme was put through the test of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court,
in Reed v. Reed,' had an opportunity to plant the seed for equal protection
from sex-based discrimination; however, the opportunity was not taken.
The cause of action, in Reed, arose due to the untimely death of
Richard L. Reed, a minor, who died intestate. Approximately seven
months subsequent to Richard's death, his mother filed a petition with the
local Probate Court in an effort to secure appointment as administratrix
of her son's estate. The father of the decedent thereafter filed a competing
petition. The Probate Court held a joint hearing on the two petitions, and
rendered a decision in favor of the father.2 The Probate Court interpreted
the applicable sections of the Idaho Code as compelling a mandatory
3
preference for the father because of his sex.
THE WOMEN'S

In rendering its decision, the Probate Court expressly acknowledged

192 S. CL 251 (1971).
2 ld. at 252.
3 Id. The controlling statutes of the IDAHo CoDE were

§ 15-312, and 15-314. Section

15-312 reads:
Priorities in right of administration-Administration of the estate of a person
dying intestate must be granted to some one or more of the persons hereinafter
mentioned, and they are respectively entitled thereto in the following order:
1. The surviving husband or wife or some competent person
whom he or she may request to have appointed.

2. The children.
3. The father or mother [emphasis added).
4. The brothers.
5. The sisters.
6. The grandchildren.
7. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
8. Any of the kindred.
9. The public administrator.
10. The creditors of such person at the time of death.
11. Any person legally competent.
If the decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of his decease, the
surviving partner must in no case be appointed administrator of his estate.
IDAHO CODE, § 15-312 (1864) (repealed effective July 1, 1972). Section 15-314
indicates: "of several persons claiming and equally entitled [under § 15-3121 to
administer, males must be preferred to females [emphasis added], and relatives of the
whole to those of the half blood." IDA-o CoDE, 1 15-314 (1864) (repealed effective
July 1, 1972).
[251]
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the equality of the two competing parties under the controlling state
statute. 4 It was further noted that neither party was burdened by any legal
disability. 5 The Probate Court ruled, however, that due to the applicable
state statute, male candidates must be given mandatory preference over
an equally qualified female candidate. 6
Decedent's mother appealed the Probate Court's order to the District
Court, and her appeal was treated as a constitutional attack on the state
statute which compelled the mandatory preference for a male over an
equally qualified female candidate. 7 The District Court concluded that
the applicable state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore was invalid.8 The controversy
was remanded to the Probate Court for its decision as to which
of the two competing parties was best qualified to conduct the
administration of the estate.
The District Court's order was not followed because the father
appealed the order to the Idaho Supreme Court. The State Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the original verdict of the Probate Court 9 The
Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the controlling state statute' 0 was
not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and rejected the argument that the absolute preference given to the
male over the equally qualified female candidate was a sufficient basis to
strike down the statute as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection."
The Idaho Supreme Court decision was subsequently appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. 12 The United States Supreme Court held
that the arbitrary preference, in favor of the male sex, created by the
Idaho Code, was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment mandate
prohibiting a state from denying the equal protection of the laws to any
individual within the state's jurisdiction. 3 The Court noted that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the
states from treating different classes of people in different ways. 4 The

4 IDAHO CODE, § 15-312 (1864) (repealed effective July 1, 1972).
592 S. CL at 252.
6Id. The Probate Court was referring to § 15-314 of the Idaho Code.
7 Id.
8 92 S. Ct. at 253.
9 Id.
10 IDAHo CoDE, § 15-314 (1864)

(repealed effective July 1, 1972).

11 92 S. Ct. at 253.
12 The appeal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) (1948).
13 92 S. Ct. at 253.
14 The Supreme Court cited the following cases in reference
doctrine: McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/4

to this constitutional
802 (1968); Railway
Lindsley v. Natural
113 U.S. 27 (1885).
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Court indicated, however, that the states are restricted in regard to such
classifications in that:
The Equal Protection Clause... does... deny to States the power
to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so15 that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike."'
The salient issue herein was whether a difference in the sex of the
competing parties, who sought appointment as administrator of decedent's
estate, was to be deemed as rationally related to the state objective
fostered by the operation of the two sections of the Idaho Code.' 6 The
Supreme Court of Idaho had held that the objective advanced by one
of the constitutionally attacked statutes was to eliminate the conflict that
would arise under the other statute when two or more individuals, equally
qualified, were seeking a letter of administration. The Idaho court
reasoned that this result would spare the Probate Court from determining
the issue of whom to appoint.' 7 The Idaho court further concluded
that the elimination of females was "Neither an illogical nor arbitrary
method devised by the legislature to resolve an issue that would otherwise
require a hearing as to the relative merits... of the two or more
petitioning relatives. . . ." 18
The United States Supreme Court noted that the state objective,
decreasing the workload of probate courts via the elimination of one class
of potential contestants, had some measure of legitimacy.' 9 The Court
stressed, however, that the ultimate issue was whether or not the state
statute advanced such an objective "[In a manner consistent with
the command of the Equal Protection Clause." 20 In holding that it
did not, the Court stated:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive

1592 S. Ci

at 253-54. The Court quoted, in part, from Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
16 IDAHO CODE H 15-312, 15-314 (1864) (repealed effective July 1, 1972).
17 Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
18 Id.
19 92 S.Ct.
20 Id.

at 254.
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values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context
may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.2 '
It was also indicated that the state statute was an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause since it provided different
22
treatment for males and females similarly situated.
Superficially, Reed is yet another example of how the Equal
Protection Clause may be used to strike down state statutes which embody
arbitrary classifications that are neither fairly nor substantially related
to the object of the statute, and which bring about the invidious
discrimination that is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. It must
stressed that the outcome of Reed is clearly commendable in terms of
justice. What is troublesome is the fact that one may contend that the
Supreme Court hedged, perhaps avoided, an excellent opportunity in
which to expand the constitutional scope of the Equal Protection Clause.
Reed afforded the Supreme Court the opportunity to extend the full
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to classifications based solely on
sex. The fact that the holding represented the first time the Supreme Court
struck down a sex-based classification as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause might lead one to conclude that the Reed case has in fact expanded
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause by including sex-based
discrimination with the previously protected areas of race, national origin,
and poverty. However, notwithstanding the specific holding in Reed, the
decision provides only minimum support to sexual equality.
The advocates of equal rights for women had placed much hope and
reliance on the possibility that the Supreme Court would totally reject the
traditional view as to the female's separate niche within society, 23 along

21Id.
22

Id.

23 See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (females denied
access to the ballot); Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (admission to the
bar). See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) where
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion indicated:
Man is, or should be, women's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood.

The Supreme Court, in Bradwell, affirmed the exclusion of females from the legal
profession.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/4
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24
that is applied in
with the traditional "reasonable classification" test
regard to the Equal Protection Clause. When probable jurisdiction of the
Reed case was noted,25 it was undoubtedly felt that the Supreme Court
would render a precedent decision by applying to sex-based classifications
the standard of strict judicial scrutiny that has evolved in equal protection
theory. One such strict scrutiny standard involves the "fundamental right"
doctrine. 26 Upon application of this standard, if a fundamental right is
affected, statutes which embody differential classification and treatment
are valid only if the government affirmatively manifests a compelling
27
necessity for the operation of the statute. The second strict scrutiny
standard is the "suspect classification" formula that initially emerged in
cases reviewing statutes that were based on racial differences. The standard
under this formula is that certain classifications, for example, those based
on race or wealth are "suspect," and will be upheld only if the statute
relationship is insufficient) to effectuate
is needed (a mere rational
28
a compelling state interest.

The Supreme Court, in Reed, disappointed the expectations and
aspirations of the advocates of equal rights for women. The Court clearly
2
4The reasonable classification test has been labeled by some writers as the restrained
judicial review standard. See Comment, Are Sex-Based ClassificationsConstitutionally
Suspect? 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 481, 485-495 (1971). Under the reasonable classification
test, a statute will not be declared as violative of the Equal Protection Clause unless
it has no reasonable basis. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957). In
essence, the traditional Equal Protection Clause test was that if the classification is
reasonable, and rested on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the statute, and treated all people who are similarly situated
in the same way, then the statute satisfies the mandate of equal protection of the
laws. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
25401 U.S. 934 (1971).
26 The "fundamental right" test has been labeled as Active judicial review. See Note,
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 60-71 (1970); Comment, supra
note 24, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. at 493-495.
27 For the "fundamental right" doctrine see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 626-630 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1120-1123,
1127-1131 (1969); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need A
Constitutional Amendment? 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1506-1507 (1971).
28
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964). Although the "suspect classification" test has been primarily used in
regard to reviewing racial classifications, the standard has been used as to differences
based on alienage and national ancestry. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); cf. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). For recent publicacations as to this standard see Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, supra
note 27, at 1087-1120, 1124-1127; Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection: Do We
Need A Constitutional Amendment? supra note 27, at 1507-1516. The California
Supreme Court has recently invalidated a state statute which had precluded almost all
women from tending bar on the grounds that sex-based classifications should be dealt
with as suspect. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d. 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971). The "suspect classification" standard was used to invalidate the
imposition of more severe criminal sanctions for females as opposed to males. United
States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968).
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did not expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit
sex-based discrimination. The opinion rendered was essentially sterile.
Such keynote phrases as fundamental rights, suspect classification, strict
scrutiny, and compelling state interest were not even mentioned let alone
applied in the process of reviewing the controversy.
The holding was not based, either impliedly or remotely, on the
standards of strict judicial scrutiny. The "compelling state interest" test
was left in the court chambers. The court, in failing to discuss this
test within the opinon, has perhaps impliedly recognized that protection
from sex-grounded discrimination is not within the scope of those fundamental rights that are to be jealously cherished and preserved by the Equal
Protection Clause, and that a statutory classification scheme based on sex
is not to be deemed as "suspect." What is most distressing, however, is the
Court's failure to overrule or even to mention previous Supreme Court
holdings in which sex was deemed as a valid basis of classification.
In arriving at its decision, the Court chose to implement the less rigid
"reasonable classification" test. The use of this test is an implication that
sex-based discrimination involves a classification held in a lesser degree
of constitutional priority, in that this restrained standard of judicial
scrutiny is indeed easier satisfied by the state in its effort to uphold
the validity of the statute in controversy.
In applying the "reasonable classification" standard, a deciding factor
was that the statute in issue was considered to be unreasonably
capricious,29 with a classification differentiation that failed to fairly or
substantially relate to the objective of the law.30 As the Court stated:
"[W]e 'have concluded that the arbitrarypreference established in favor of
males by section 15-314 of the Idaho Code cannot stand in the face of the
Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State deny equal protection
of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction." 31 (Emphasis added.)
It therefore appears as if the state statute was struck down solely because it
was not reasonably related to the objective of the statute.32 One may
logically deduce, therefore, that the Reed case has in no way strengthened
the viability of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to sex-based
discrimination. It may be argued, however, that perhaps the Court, in

2992
30 Id.
31

S. Ct. at 254.

92 S. Ct. at 253.

The Idaho Supreme Court had concluded that the statute was neither an irrational
nor arbitrary means in which to effectuate the object of the law. See supra note 17-18.
Another indication that the sole basis for invalidating the statute was because it lacked
any reasonable basis can be found in the formulation of the issue in dispute where the
court asserted: "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in

32

the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of H 15-312

and 15-314." [Emphasis added]. Reed v. Reed, 92 S. Ct. at 254.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/4
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Reed, has in fact politely deterred any short-term possibility of expanding
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause so as to remedy the invidious
discrimination that is coupled wi'th sex-grounded discrimination. The
Reed opinion may very well be subsequently used by the states to support
the contention that the court has firmly accepted the constitutional dogma
that sex-oriented discrimination is proper and valid as long as reasonably
related to a legitimate state interest.
The significance of the Reed result and methodology in regard to
future applications of the Equal Protection Clause as to sex-based
discriminatory classification is distressing. The opinion seemingly indicates
the unfortunate implication that the Supreme Court is unwilling to extend
equal protection, as applied to sex-classification, beyond the traditional
bounds of the "reasonable classification" standard. By condoning this
passive standard of equal protection review, the Court has impliedly
granted to the states broad discretion as to the treatment of women's
rights. The Court delegates such broad discretion, notwithstanding the
has been considered intolerable as to other
fact that such a discretion
33
classes within society.
The use of the restrained standard will surely bring about nominal
progress in regard to the equal protection movement for women. It is
unrealistic to contend that the traditional "reasonable classification"
approach to equal protection can afford the basis for which to achieve
any substantial degree of success in the area of sex-based classification.
This is so because under the restrained review approach, the
classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state
objective. 34 In considering the rationally related variable, mathematical
precision is not required, 35 and the statute will survive attack if any state
36
of facts may be reasonably conceived as a justification. Therefore, if the
to fostering
conducive
way
some
in
is
statute
the
purpose behind
the public welfare, 37 and does not chill the exercise of constitutionally

33 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)

(strict scrutiny review

on infringement imposed on ground of race and national origin); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (strict scrutiny of state law which infringed man's right
of procreation); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (strict review of exclusion of people from job on ground
of lineage).
34 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457, 464-65 (1957).
35 See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
36 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 426.
37 See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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protected rights, 38 then a legitimate government objective exists. As to the
consideration as to whether or not the classification has any reasonable
relation to a legitimate state objective or purpose, the plaintiff must show
that the classification scheme is arbitrary and without a reasonable relation
by demonstrating that the scheme is irrational in light of its object, or due
to the discriminatory nature evidenced by the individuals without or
within the class scheme. 39 It can be seen, therefore, that the "reasonable
classification" standard, at best, is capable of achieving only nominal
results in the area of sex-based classification. 40
The unfortunate aspect associated with the Reed decision is that the
Supreme Court, by both its holding and methodology, has, in effect,
reassured the States that sex-based classifications are constitutionally
proper if the elements of the reasonableness test are met. This is
advocation of the status quo. It would appear to be unlikely that the
States, unless enlightened by some extraordinary occurrence, will react
to the Reed decision with any degree of urgency in terms of progressive
reevaluation of their particular sex-classified laws. Any state reevaluation,
based on the Reed case, may in fact be allocated towards the goal
of seeing that the particular statute is insulated so as to meet the elements
of the reasonableness test.
Another perplexing aspect of the Reed opinion is, without doubt, the
most unsettling. The Supreme Court, in Reed, had the opportunity to
crush a myth that has prevailed throughout recorded history in almost
every known society; namely, that sex is a valid basis for classification
schemes. The Court, by remaining silent, has impliedly advocated the status

38

See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
39 Discrimination evidenced by those without or within a class scheme is generally
known as overinclusive and underinclusive classification. In theory, only those people
who have the classified trait at which the law is directed are to be within the
classification scheme. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
supra, note 24 at 347-353. Underinclusive classifications seem to be easier to uphold
than overinclusive schemes. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). But see
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). Overinclusive classifications, due to the
heavy burden on those within the classified scheme, are harder to justify, and are thus
invalidated with greater frequency. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
401t must be noted that the Court, in Reed, failed to discuss the issue of whether or
not sex can ever be rationally related to any legitimate state objective. Such silence,
however, may in fact be an implied admission that sex-based classifications can be
reasonably related to legitimate state objectives, and that sex is a valid basis of
classification. In any event, the court in Reed has failed to overrule the traditional
view that sex is a proper basis of classification. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/4

8

Murphy: The Reed Case

Spring, 1972]

THE REED CASE

quo. The status quo, unfortunately, will encourage the continued confine41
ment of the female to different and, by many standards, inferior status.
Discrimination involving the American female has been prevalent
and diverse. Traditionally, the inferior social, as well as legal, status of
women has been passively tolerated. Today, the enlightened female
is demanding reform in numerous areas. The women's rights advocates are
calling for a reevaluation and redefinition of the women's niche within
contemporary society. In short, the liberated woman will no longer tolerate
the traditional view as to the woman's proper place. The traditional view
will no longer be tolerated because it is unjust, unneeded, devoid of any
rational basis, and perhaps most significant, disliked and unwanted.
This writer contends that the American legal system will continue to
command and effectuate an inferior status for women, as long as the legal
structure condones and permits any differentiation in legal treatment on
the basis of sex. Discrimination is inherent in any sex-based law because
there will always be a substantial percentage of women who do not fit
the stereotype female mold upon which the statute is premised. Also,
discrimination in one area must, and does, create discriminatory patterns
in other areas. For example, a woman may receive equal treatment as to
employment; however, if she is denied equal access to educational facilities,
then she will be disadvantaged within the job market area notwithstanding
the fact that she receives equal treatment as to employment.
The Supreme Court, in Reed, by failing to utilize the strict scrutiny
standard of the "compelling state interest" test, has implied that protection
from sex discrimination is not a fundamental right, nor important enough
to be within the "suspect" classification category. This is significant in that
the "compelling state interest" doctrine is applied so as to cancel the
presumption of validity (whereas the reasonableness standard assumes
the constitutionality of the challenged statute, and the presumption
remains until the plaintiff rebuts it). The strict scrutiny standards place
a heavy burden on the government to justify, by demonstrating a
compelling state interest, the differential treatment. Thus, the strict scrutiny
standards are indeed more powerful tools with which to attack sex-based
classifications, as opposed to the less rigid reasonableness test.

41

For discussion as to the legal status of females in both American and English

history, see E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE (1959); L. KANOW1TZ, WOMEN AN

THE LAW (1969); A. KRADITOR, UP FROM THE PEDESTAL (1968); Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 BOSTON U. L. REV. 723 (1935); Note,
Sex, Discrimination and the Constitution, 2 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1950). As to the
widespread discrimination against the female in the American legal system see
Cavanagh, "A Little Dearer than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine
Personality, 6 HAsv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIa. L. REv. 260 (1971); Seidenberg, The
Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 262 (1970).
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The court, in Reed, by implying thal there is nothing inherently
wrong with sex-based classification, if reasonable, has reaffirmed, in
a discrete way, the traditional American view towards the female, namely,
that there is something about her that necessitates different treatment from
her male counterpart. Unfortunately, the differentiation in legal treatment
on the basis of sex will support the status quo, and this, in turn, will enable
our legal structure to continue to command an inferior status for women.
Woman cannot be truly liberated from the inferior status that binds
her spirit until the legal system eliminates the archaic equation: different
sex=different legal protection.

II. THE REED CASE: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
"[W]e do not allow ourselves to be obfuscated by medieval
views regarding the legal status of women and the common law's
reflection of them .... 42
There are, perhaps, three workable means in which to initiate the
necessary changes within our legal structure in order to bring about equal
rights for women. One method is the extension of the strict judicial review
doctrines associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to sex-based discrimination. A second is by the ad hoc
revision of both the current federal and state laws. The third means is the
promulgation of a new constitutional amendment. The ultimate dilemma,
therefore, is what method, or combinations thereof, will be most conducive
to eliminating sex-based discrimination from the legal structure.
The first method does not appear to be a realistic way in which to
effectuate the eradication of sex discrimination from the law. As previously
noted,43 the Reed decision reflects what appears to be an unwillingness on
behalf of the Supreme Court to extend the strict review doctrines to
sex-based classifications. And, as previously indicated, 44 the use of the
restrained doctrine does not seem to be conducive to achieving any
substantive success or progress in the area of sex discrimination.
Furthermore, even if the Court should subsequently apply the
"compelling state interest" doctrine to sex-based discriminatory laws, there
would be inherent dilemmas to overcome in that the doctrine is somewhat
deficient as a tool for obtaining equal rights for women. The "compelling
state interest" test becomes operational only when the particular right
allegedly affected is deemed to be a fundamental one or when the
classification scheme is "suspect." The Court has been in disagreement
as to what types of interests are to be placed within this category of

42

United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.).

43See text at 254 supra.
44

See text at 257 supra.
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45
specially protected constitutional rights. As a result, the "fundamental
interest" standard might not be applied to numerous areas where
females are treated differently from males, such, as an example, the
right to sue for loss of consortium.
The "suspect classification" standard, notwithstanding the fact that
it is more rigid than the traditional reasonableness standard, allows
the government to justify a "suspect" classification by demonstrating
4
a compelling state interest for the statutory scheme. 6 Thus, this more
rigid standard would not bring about the equality which can exist
only if all sex-based discriminatory laws are abolished.

The second method by which to achieve the needed change within
the legal system in order to eliminate sex-based discriminatory laws is the
ad hoc revision of federal and state laws. The piecemeal reformation of
existing laws, unfortunately, does not offer a realistic solution to the sex
discrimination problem. This method necessitates numerous actions by
Congress, fifty state legislatures, the courts and executive agencies within
each of these jurisdictions, and by the many political subdivisions
within each state. It seems illogical to assume that this great aggregate
of governmental machinery could be effectively mobilized to revise and
repeal the existing law. Campaigns to change the current laws could in
fact lag on for decades, and perhaps in some areas of sex discrimination,
the needed change could never be attained.
Even if it should be possible to mobilize America's political
machinery, legislative revision would not offer an adequate foundation
in which to bring about complete legal equality for women. There is
needed a single, unambiguous theory of women's equality under the
law, and for a uniform nationwide application of this theory. This is not
possible by legislative revision alone in that the formulation of policy
would be split between multiple federal, state, and local agencies.
Piecemeal legislative revision, in effect, has been in progress
throughout this century. The results have been, at best, nominal and
insignificant. In a very realistic sense, this method lacks the coherence

(Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
45See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 338 (1971)

Shapiro v. Thompson,

394

U.S. 618, 655 (1969)

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

46The type of and numbers of classification schemes that would be sustained under
a "suspect classification" standard would depend on the degree of the burden of
justification which the court requires the government to carry. If the court requires
the state to show a perfect match between the class scheme and the object of the
law, a small per cent of sex-based statutes would be upheld. Conversely, if the court
uses a balancing method, and weighs the legislative mismatch with the inconvenience
of voiding the law, then a substantial per cent of sex-based classifications would be
upheld. See Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection: Do We Need A Constitutional Amendment?, supra note 27, at 1509-1513.
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and sustained political effort that is necessary in order to attain the
basic, fundamental change as to the legal status of women.
The third means of obtaining the elimination of sex-based discrimination involves the enactment of a new constitutional amendment. The
proposed amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the
47
date of ratification.
The fundamental principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that
sex is not an allowable factor in the determination of the legal rights
of any citizen, male or female. This would mean, therefore, that the
treatment of any citizen by the law must not be based on the sex
factor. Sex, in essence, would be a prohibited classification.
The basic theme of the Equal Rights Amendment stems from two
fundamental values inherent in the decision to eradicate sex discrimination
from our legal structure. First, the amendment incorporates the moral
conviction that women, in the collective sense, can no longer be relegated
to an inferior status within our society. Women are entitled to maintain
an equal status with men. Thus, the decision to end the historically
inferior social status of the female necessitates the prohibition of sex
classification in law.
The second basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that
classification by sex is always an overclassification. In a sex-classified
scheme, all males or all females are thereby included or excluded
regardless of the degree to which some members of each sex possess the
characteristics relevant as to the statutory scheme. The result of such
overclassification does indeed conflict with the fundamental concern of
our society with the individual. Overclassification, in effect, negates all
values as to individual self-fulfillment.
The constitutional mandate of the new amendment must be absolute.
The salient issue under the Equal Rights Amendment cannot be equal but
different, reasonable or arbitrary classification, suspect classification, fundamental right or interest, or the demands of administrative practicality.
Equality of rights, then, mandates that sex should not and must not be a
factor as to treatment under the law. The basic legal premise underlying the
Equal Rights Amendment, therefore, is that the law shall concern itself

47H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1971).
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only with the particular attributes of individuals, and not with a
classification scheme based on the broad and improper element of sex.
It is undisputed that classifications are an essential element of
lawmaking. The Equal Rights Amendment does not require the
elimination of all classifications based on the awareness of the differences
between people. The Amendment merely prohibits the use of sex as
a basis for legal differentiation. It allows the government to continue
to classify on the basis of the real differences in the life situations
and attributes of individuals.
The fundamental premise behind the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment, that differences in treatment under the law must not be
based on the sex factor, but rather on the attributes and abilities of
the individual that are relevant to the classification differentiation, has
a foundation in the basic values of our philosophy.

HI. CONCLUSION
The Reed decision is an unfortunate omen for the future progress
of the equal rights for women movement. The implication of the Reed
decision is that sex-based classification is valid if reasonable. The
restrained standard of the reasonableness test is by no means conducive
to the eradication of sex-based discrimination. From 'the aforementioned
implications of the Reed result and methodology, it appears as if the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the remedy
for sex-based classification. Reliance on legislative revision, via piecemeal
efforts, of the existing federal and state laws is both illogical and unreasonable. The realistic remedy for the elimination of sex discrimination
seemingly lies with the enactment of the new Equal Rights Amendment.
The metamorphosis of our legal system to one which establishes equal
rights for women under the law is indeed long overdue. The current dual
system of legal rights has resulted in relegating over half of the population
to an inferior status within society. What was commenced with the Nineteenth Amendment, extending to women the right to vote, must now be
completed by securing equal treatment to women in all areas of legal rights.
JOHN P. MURP',
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